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Referring to the Muslim Brotherhood as at least partly secular may
seem strange. Islamist organisations, after all, want Islam to permeate
public and private life. Yet the Brotherhood only emerged in a rapidly
modernising sovereign Egypt in which functional differentiation of state
institutions had occurred. Drawing on this understanding of secularity
as proposed by Charles Taylor, Katerina Dalacoura presents the Muslim
Brotherhood as a secular phenomenon.
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The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the wider Islamist movement of
which it is an instance, are in many ways a secular phenomenon. If we
de ne “secularity” not only as the weakening of religious belief, but also
as the idea that faith becomes one option among others; and
“secularization” as the process of institutional and functional
differentiation of modern state structures and the resultant
marginalization of religious authority, then the Brotherhood, similarly to
other Islamist entities, can be seen as a product of modernity and the
“secular age.” This transpires in two ways. First, for the Brotherhood,
“Islam” is an identi able set of beliefs that can be actively implemented
and used as guidelines to reform society. Second, the parameters of the
political order it proposes are de ned by the context of the secular,
modern nation-state.
Charles Taylor’s book, A Secular Age, focuses on the Western world. It
argues that secularity consists of three aspects. The  rst, “secularity 1,”
refers to “common institutions and practices—most obviously, but not
only, the state.” The modern state is free from the connection with faith
or God, churches are separate from political structures, and religion or
its absence is largely a private matter. Public spaces have been
“emptied of God, or any reference to ultimate reality.” Furthermore,
Taylor argues, “the considerations we act on are internal to the
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‘rationality’ of each sphere—maximum gain within the economy, the
greatest bene t to the greatest number in the political area, and so on.”
This emptying of religion from autonomous social spheres is
compatible, however, with the majority of people still believing in God,
as demonstrated by the example of the United States.
The second meaning of secularity, according to Taylor, is “the falling off
of religious belief and practice, in people turning away from God, and no
longer going to Church.” This is what people most think about when
they de ne our times as secular. However, secularity must also be
understood in a third sense, secularity 3, which focuses on conditions
of belief. “The shift to secularity in this sense consists, among other
things, of a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged
and, indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one
option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace.” The
United States is not secularized in the second sense—because levels of
religiosity remain high—but it is secularized in the third. Taylor’s book
focuses on secularity in the third sense. It traces the evolution of
Western societies from a situation where it was virtually impossible not
to believe in God (where belief was the “default option”) to one where
“faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among
others.”
Taylor states that, outside of the West, “almost all other contemporary
societies (e.g. Islamic countries, India, Africa)”—and people in the rest
of human history—do not live in a secular age. When he discusses
secularity in the third sense, of belief being one option among many, he
writes that “clear contrast cases today would be the majority of Muslim
societies, or the milieu in which the vast majority of Indians live.” Taylor
also writes that, though he focuses on the West, this is a world of
“multiple modernities.” Secularity, like other features of modernity,  nds
different expressions in different civilizations.
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I would like to argue, however, using the example of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, that the differences between Western and non-
Western settings are not really as stark as Taylor suggests and that
“Islamic countries” or “Muslim societies” (as Taylor calls them) have
commonalities in their religious experience with Western societies.
Taylor argues that a “purely self-su cient humanism,” in which human
beings are “at the top of the order,” became an option in the West in the
period of modern secularity (p. 18). In the West, there was a gradual
sorting out in experience “by which it became possible to relate to
certain realities as purely ‘natural’,” and disintricate them from the
transcendent; whereby it eventually became possible to see the
immediate surroundings of our lives as existing on this ‘natural’ plane.”
This sorting out was compatible with belief in God and was even
“accompanied by a more conscious and zealous dedication to God.”
Taylor writes: “It has often been noted how secularization went along
with an intensi cation of religious faith.” During the Reformation and
Counter-Reformation in Europe, in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, religion became a matter of intense personal decision.
This resonates with developments in modern Egyptian history and with
the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt has a long history of
modernization—and secularization in the sense of the expansion of
state institutions—from the nineteenth century onwards. The
Brotherhood’s establishment in 1928 by Hassan al Banna occurred
within the context of that ongoing process. The movement’s popularity
in the 1930s and 1940s can also be seen as an outcome of
intensi cation of religious faith, at least in some segments of the
Egyptian population. The Brotherhood’s appeal increased after the
1970s, following a period in Egyptian history—in the 1950s and 1960s—
when Egyptian and Arab nationalisms were enthusiastically adhered to.
Taylor links the rise of humanism with “the urge to Reform”—in the
sense of “a drive to make over the whole society to higher standards.”
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He argues that a “buffered identity, impervious to the enchanted
cosmos,” developed among important elites in Latin Christendom.
Society gradually came to be conceived as made up of individuals.
What he calls “the Great Disembedding” involved a new self-
understanding of our social existence, which gave “unprecedented
primacy to the individual.” In earlier societies there had been an inability
to imagine the self outside a particular context, whereas now the
abstract question of emigrating or changing religion is possible (this is
what “disembedding” refers to). Taylor argues that the emergence of
the humanist alternative set in motion “something like a nova effect,
spawning an ever-widening variety of moral/spiritual options.” Originally
con ned to elites, the nova effect becomes generalized and in the
second half of the twentieth century there arises in Western societies a
generalized culture of “authenticity” or expressive individualism. The
“buffered self” is at the center of this: having a boundary between inside
(thought) and outside (nature, the physical) “comes about through the
replacement of a cosmos of spirits and forces by a mechanistic
universe” and gives us “a sense of power, of capacity, in being able to
order our world and ourselves.”
Once again, there are echoes of such developments in the history of the
Egyptian Brotherhood, a movement that aimed to reform society
starting with the individual. The Brotherhood emerged from within a
wider tradition of Sala  modernism, which coalesced around the  gures
of Jamal ad Din al Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in the Middle East of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Sala sm advocated
returning to the origins of Islam by eliminating the popular, false
accretions and superstitions that had accumulated over the centuries,
and had undermined the purity of its message. Reforming Islam, the
objective of the movement, would be realized if the believer, singly or
collectively, took charge of the situation and steered Islam away from
corrupt popular practices and towards a reformed understanding. For
Hassan al Banna, before the reform of society and the institution of an
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Islamic state could be attained, the individual would have to be
reformed. Reforming Islam would be achieved by returning to the
“fundamentals” of the religion (the Koran and the Hadith) and to a
pristine early history of the time of the Prophet Muhammad, which was
to be revered and emulated as an ideal. Muslims joined the movement
as a result of choice, and personal choice at that. The Brotherhood—like
most Islamist movements in the Middle East—was not the product of
traditional settings, and it is typically stronger in urban rather than rural
areas. Brotherhood members have been, very frequently, “born-again”
Muslims (for want of a better term). They have actively embraced Islam
and have taken the decision to put it in the center of their lives. In doing
this, they have sometimes distanced themselves from their families and
the older generation.
Let us now return to Taylor’s de nition of secularity and, speci cally, his
distinction between secularities 2 and 3. The very existence of the
Muslim Brotherhood—since its inception and particularly since the
1970s—can be seen as evidence that Egypt is not a secular society.
Most Egyptians (the Coptic minority as well as the Muslim majority)
believe in God, and atheists are few. But things have not always been
this way. In the past few decades, The Brotherhood has been the
bene ciary of increased levels of religiosity in Egypt, which indicates
that belief has become one option among others. More importantly, this
increased religiosity has involved the (re)adoption of faith as a result of
a conscious personal decision and the active pursuit of religious
obligations. This is not dissimilar to the Western experience of
secularity, as Taylor describes it.
Our next focus is Taylor’s de nition of secularity as “relegating God and
religion to the margins of the various public spheres” (secularity 1).
Many have argued that in the Middle East such marginalization has
clearly not occurred. This is not only a physical observation—the
widespread existence and use of religious worship spaces—but more
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crucially refers to the continuing relevance of and appeal to
supernatural authority and religious belief in all walks of life. One
frequent explanation for this phenomenon is that in the Middle East
there is no differentiation between religion and politics because Islam,
being an inherently political religion, does not allow for it.
However, such views about the Middle East can be contested. With the
gradual introduction of the nation-state in the post-nineteenth century
Middle East, a new set of pervasive, if not all-powerful, structures of
authority came into being. They entailed the secularization of social,
educational, cultural and political structures in the sense that religious
authorities were cut off from these areas of life, which they had
previously dominated. Furthermore, secularization occurred because
the modern nation-state vested itself with the sovereign right to
legislate, further wresting authority away from religious authorities in
the legal sphere.
In sum, there are many similarities between the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt and the Western experience of secularity and secularization as
described by Taylor. The Brotherhood emerged in the context of the
modern Egyptian state in the 1920s and, since then, its political project
and worldview have been shaped by secular state structures. In its drive
to reform Islam, the movement placed the individual at center stage.
The Brotherhood is the product of a wave of Islamic revivalism that is
characteristic of modernity and, in many ways, is integrally linked to
secularism, as it has been in the Western experience.
Referring to the West, Taylor argues that it is impossible to de ne the
idea of “secularization” exactly. The concept may be challenged by
asking questions such as: has religion declined as much as it appears
to have? Did it occupy that much space in the past? Did a past golden
age of religion exist? What is religion? If we de ne it as the search for
the spiritual, it is arguably as present as ever. Even in the age of faith,
not everyone was devout. However, Taylor writes that most of us agree
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that “something that deserves this title [secularization] has taken place
in our civilization.” He maintains that the secularization thesis can resist
most of the above questions and challenges though trying to
understand exactly what happened “helps us re ne our account.”
If the Western experience of “secularity” and “secularization” is so
varied that it is impossible for the terms to be precisely de ned, beyond
the West, “each case is different.” However, the historical setting in
which the Egyptian Brotherhood emerged and evolved, although not
identical to the Western one described by Taylor, has considerable
commonalities with it. This historical experience contains enough
similar characteristics to allow for a common language and therefore
the possibility of understanding, across regions and cultures. The
implicit juxtaposition between “secular” and “Islamic” must be
questioned. Islamist movements themselves are partly secular; they are
products of modernity and constitute a break with the traditional world,
rather than its continuation.
Note: This article was originally published by The Immanent Frame.
Note: For more on this topic, read Dr Dalacoura’s recent paper
‘Islamism, secularization, secularity: the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
as a phenomenon of a secular age’ here.
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